INTRODUCTION
Spatial models of political competition have been one of the mainstays of political science over the past few decades (e.g. Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984, 1990; Munger 1994, 1997) . As Dow (1998) notes, however, despite the increasing theoretical sophistication of spatial theories of voting, these are increasingly criticized for not having made equivalent contributions to the empirical study of electoral competition. In multiparty electoral contexts, furthermore, spatial theory has provided even more limited insight (Laver and Schofield 1990; Macdonald et. al. 1991 Macdonald et. al. , 1995 Iversen 1994; Merrill 1995; Merrill and Grofman 1999) . Our aim is to develop new empirical sources for testing spatial models, by generating reliable maps both voters and parties in a common policy space.
Previous efforts to map policy spaces have been limited by a lack of concrete and reliable data on comparable locations of parties and voters. The essential problem is that estimates of voter and party positions tend to come from different sources, making it difficult to map a single common space containing both types of actor. Typical sources of voter preferences come from election studies and opinion surveys, while estimates for parties may come from elite surveys, content analyses of texts produced by parties, surveys of political experts, or estimation of voting returns or patterns. For example, work by coauthors (1987, 2001 ) uses the content analysis of party manifestos to estimate party policy positions. Dow (2001) generated two-dimensional density estimations of voter positions based on surveys where respondents indicated their proximity to parties; Dow (1998) used similar methods to generate one-dimensional voter density estimates. Other possibilities include computerized word scoring of political documents (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003) or factor analyses of voting returns (Myagkov and Ordeshook 1998).
The only way for both sets of estimates to come from the same source is to estimate party positions using survey respondent placements of parties on a priori policy dimensions and to estimate voter positions from responses to attitude questions in the same survey. The problems with doing this are that:
• Data on survey respondent placements of party positions are far less extensive and comprehensive than, e.g., expert survey data on these positions -we are at the mercy of those survey questions on party positions that happen to have been asked.
•
As we show below, such placements are so intensely subjective to individual respondents that they may or may not form the basis of reliable and valid indicators of overall party positions in the space.
Some have attempted to draw on separate sources to map voters and experts, but these also suffer from related problems. For instance, Schofield et. al. (1998) 
draw on
Eurobarometer data for voter positions, and the European Political Parties Middle Level Elites survey to estimate party positions. In order to mate the two sources, however, they construct policy scales indirectly using factor analytic techniques from batteries of related questions.
In follows we set out to address this problem in two ways. First we explore ways of using the survey placements of party positions. Second we explore ways of mapping expert survey estimates of party policy positions into policy spaces defined by voters' estimated ideal points on the same policy dimensions. We do all of this using previously unanalyzed data from the Irish National Election Study (INES) and from a new expert survey of Irish party positions. Our primary objective is to show how independent sources of party and public policy positions can be integrated and mapped onto the same policy space.
MEASURING THE IRISH POLICY SPACE: DATA
Identifying the policy terrain to be mapped for Ireland involves first identifying the most For three key policy dimensions, the INES asked voters to locate both themselves and each of the main parties on scales with explicitly defined endpoints. These dimensions concerned:
• economic policy, specifically the trade-off between cutting taxes and increasing public spending in areas such as health and education; • "social" policy, specifically the issue of whether abortion should be totally banned or made widely available;
• Northern Ireland, specifically the issue of whether to insist on a united Ireland immediately or abandon this aim altogether;
As we shall see, the economic and Northern Ireland policy dimensions were judged in our expert survey to be the two most important in Irish politics in 2002, while the issue of abortion has been the subject of a series of bitter and divisive referendum campaigns. The INES not only contained self-placement questions on these scales, but also asked respondents to locate the political parties on the same scales. We present the estimates of these positions in raw form, together with their estimated overall importance for voters, in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here] Of the three, INES respondents on average thought that the economic policy dimension was most important to them personally ("very important" is coded 1, "not important at all" is coded 4). The most extreme "cut taxes" end of this 11-point (0 -10) scale is zero and the center is five -thus this scale in effect runs from right to left. Mean placements of party positions are all bunched together in the center-left of the scale, ranging from the PDs at 5.52 to the Labour Party at 6.38. Note that the mean respondent self-placement on this scale is to the left of the mean placement of the most left wing party, a matter to which we return The ranking of the mean party placements from right to left on the scale (PD, FF, FG, SF, G, Lab) tallies with that of our expert survey (see below) except that Labour is on average ranked as most left-wing by survey respondents, but a little to the right of the Greens and Sinn Féin by the experts.
The social policy dimension was on average ranked as being more important than Northern Ireland policy by survey respondents, a reversal of expert judgments of the relative salience of these dimensions. Here the range of mean party placements was slightly larger, though these were still very bunched, ranging from a most conservative mean placement of 4.50 for FF, to a most liberal of 5.41 for Labour. Mean respondent self-placement was at the conservative end of the range of party positions, at 4.72. The ranking of the mean party placements from conservative to liberal on the scale (FF, FG, G, PD, SF, Lab) tallies with that of our expert survey only to the extent of placing FF and FG as the most conservative parties.
After this, the expert survey ranks the parties (SF, PD, Lab, G).
On Northern Ireland, given the relatively extreme party placement for Sinn Féin, the range of mean party placements is larger than for the other two dimensions. This runs from a mean of 1.43 for Sinn Féin at the republican end of the scale, to one of 4.87 for the Greens.
Mean respondent self-placement was close to the mean position of FF, at 3.98. The ranking of parties on this dimension, from the republican end, was (SF, FF, PD, Lab, FG, G) . This tallies with the expert survey only in placing SF at the republican end of the scale. After this, the expert survey ranks the parties (G, FF, Lab, PD, FG). There is thus a contradiction between experts and survey respondents on the position of the Greens on this dimension.
The problem with the respondent party placements is that different respondents "centre" the parties at very different points on the same scale, and that this respondent-specific centering of the party system is highly biased by the respondents' self-placements on the same scale. Furthermore, different respondents use very different ranges on the scale to locate the set of parties. Some use the entire eleven-point scale width; a substantial number of others locate all parties at the same position. Consider each of these problems in turn. scale, that the mean of these mean placements was 5.99, but that standard deviation of these means was 1.59. In other words typical survey respondents were generating a "centre" of the six party locations on this 0-10 scale of anywhere between 3 and 9. As Figure 1 shows, the variability of party system centers for the other two scales was actually greater than this. Different survey respondents clearly had very different subjective interpretations of how the predefined endpoints of the scales related to the positions of the Irish party system as a whole.
[ Figure 1 about here] Table 2 summarizes the range between the leftmost and the rightmost party placement by each respondent on each of the three scales. For both the economic and social policy scales, just over a quarter of all respondents placed all parties in the same position, giving a zero range for their party placements. This figure was somewhat lower at 17 percent for the Northern Ireland scale. Over two-thirds of all respondents generated a maximum range of party placements of three or less on the 11-point economic and social policy scales.
[ Table 2 about here]
In a nutshell, raw mean party placements on the three policy scales investigated by the INES are aggregates of a series of individual judgments by respondents that are both highly bunched and with highly variable centers. One way to try and fix this problem is to "standardize" party placements for each respondent, rescaling these to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity. This sacrifices all information on different subjective views by different respondents about how the same set of parties stood on some policy dimension.
What is preserved are the relative positions of the six parties and the respondent on each dimension.
1
Aggregating these standard scores gives a summary of individual respondent judgments of the relative placements of the six parties on each dimension. These are reported in Table 3 , and result in considerably "crisper" and more differentiated summary of the relative positions of each party on each dimension.
[ Table 3 about here] Figure 2 reports the self-placements of survey respondents, rescaled in exactly the same way as the party positions in Table 3 . These rescaled respondent self-placements are thus on the same scale as the "standardized" party placements. As Figure 2 shows, these now look quite well-behaved and it at least seems possible we have a common policy space for both voters and parties.
[ Figure 2 about here]
THE EXPERT SURVEY RESULTS
Essentially, the problem with using survey respondent judgments about party policy positions, as we have seen, is that they are intensely subjective -with scores highly biased by the respondents' self-location on the scale in question. This was addressed above by standardizing each respondent's scores for each scale, in effect removing all substantive content from scale positions and preserving only the relative positions of parties on each scale. An alternative response is to take each survey respondent's self-location on each policy scale at face value, and attempt to place party policy positions on these scales using some external data source. There are a number of possible external data sources, but here we use a new expert survey we recently conducted as part of a 47-country comparative study. This involved sending out an e-mail invitation to participate in a web-based survey that asked country specialists to locate political parties on 10 issue dimensions. This methodology followed that of Laver and Hunt (1992) Table 4 .
[Tables 4 and 5 about here]
In addition to specific questions on policy (discussed below), the questionnaire asked each country specialist to locate parties on a general "left-right" dimension. The results are shown in Figure 5 and show that, from left to right, Irish parties range from the Greens on the left, followed by Sinn Féin and Labour, through Fine Fáil and Fine Gael in practically the same position, to the Progressive Democrats on the right.
[Figure 5 about here]
In addition to locating each party on each policy dimension, respondents were asked to indicate the relative importance of the dimension to each party. Table 5 reports these ratings, in a manner similar to that of Table 4 . The last column of Table 5 
Social policy
Favors liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (1) Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (20) We now set out to derive the best possible estimates of the distribution of voter ideal points on these same scales.
MAPPING VOTER IDEAL POINTS IN THE EXPERT SURVEY POLICY SPACE The distribution of voter ideal points on economic policy
The first task in mapping voters into the same policy space as the expert survey scales is to match question wordings and dimension meanings as closely as possible. This is not as easy as it looks because of a small but crucial difference between the wordings of expert survey and INES scales. As we have seen, the INES used an 11-point (0-10) scale to collect respondent self-placements on a range of issues, but only asked for respondent placements of party positions for three policy dimensions. The "taxes vs spending" dimension was one of these, but the endpoints of the scale for the INES question were as follows:
Government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services. (0) Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services. (10) There is a huge difference between these endpoints and those of the 20-point expert scale. This difference was introduced to make the question meaningful to mass survey respondents as opposed to academic political scientists, but was substantively unfortunate in the context of a 2002 Irish election for which the poor performance of the public health service was one of the top election issues. Any party proposing to "cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health" would have been committing electoral suicide. Table 1 Combining these three items into an additive Likert scale generated a 0-30 left-right economic policy scale with good scale reliability.
2 Figure 4 shows the distributions of respondent self-placements on this scale, comparing this with the much more highly skewed distribution of self-placements on the arguably flawed "tax cuts vs public spending" scale. We therefore take this new "public vs private" scale as our best indicator of voter positions on economic policy.
[ Figure 4 about here]
The distribution of voter ideal points on Northern Ireland policy
As with economic policy, the INES survey scale dealing with Northern Ireland on which respondents also located party positions -"insist on a United Ireland now vs abandon the aim of a United Ireland altogether" is not the one that best corresponds with the substance of the scale used in the expert survey. Much closer in substance are two 7-point attitude items asking for respondent self-placement:
3) The long term policy for Northern Ireland should be to reunify with the rest of Ireland.
(A12.4) The British government should declare its intention to withdraw from Northern
Ireland at a fixed date in the future.
3
If these scales are added together they form a 2-14 scale of respondent self-placements on Northern Ireland policy that is substantively very similar to the expert survey scale. [ Figure 5 about here]
The distribution of voter ideal points on "social" policy
The INES did not ask questions on euthanasia, but it did on abortion and homosexuality.
These questions, asking for respondent self-placement on two 0-10 scales, were: we can see whether winning parties are indeed occupying the regions of highest vote density in a particular policy space. 
REMARKS

Economic (Taxes v. Spending -Not Used!)
I would like you to look at the scale from 0 to 10 on this card. A '0' means government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and '10' means government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services. 3 In each "strongly disagree" is coded 1. Thus low scores on the scale represent a unionist position, high scales a republican position. 4 The INES scale should be inverted to ensure both scales run substantively in the same direction 5 Once again the scale must be inverted given the substance of the survey questions.
6 The R statistical package using a customized version of the hdr2d add-on package was used to compute these graphics. The density estimations involve several smoothing parameters and we tested the graphics under a wide range of these. The representations presented here represent our judgment of the best balance between informative detail and noise reduction; they are also consistent with smoothing parameters previous bivariate density plots (e.g. Schofield et. al. 1998; Dow 2001) . Details and code are available from the authors or in the replication dataset for this paper (available from the authors).
